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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TRAVIS BEN HARDING, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 970390-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, a 
second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Where evidence of an outstanding arrest warrant was not 
only relevant but necessary to explain the factual circumstances 
surrounding the instant case, did the trial court properly admit 
the evidence in conformity with rules 404 (b) and 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence? 
2. Does rule 404(b) apply to defendant's post-arrest 
statements revealing his knowledge of other persons' involvement 
in illegal activities, stolen guns, and drugs? 
1 
When an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling 
concerning the admissibility of evidence under rule 404(b), it 
"review[s] closely the trial court's justifications" but does not 
conduct a de novo review. State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 489-90 
(Utah 1997) . 
In reviewing a ruling on the admissibility of evidence 
pursuant to rule 403, an appellate court accords broad discretion 
to the determination of the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 938 (Utah 1994) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (1997). 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (1997) . 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, a 
second degree felony, when drugs were found on his person after 
he was arrested on an unrelated warrant (R. 1, 187). After a 
jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 116). The 
court sentenced him to a suspended term of l-to-15 years in the 
Utah State Prison; ordered him to serve 36 months on probation, 
with 270 days in the Utah County Jail; and levied a fine of $1000 
or 200 hours of community service, along with an $850 surcharge 
and substance abuse therapy (R. 125-26). Defendant filed this 
appeal (R. 127). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Utah 
1992). Armed with an arrest warrant in the name of "Travis Ben 
Martin,"1 Detective Clark Neilsen of the Pleasant Grove Police 
Department went to Rick's Auto, a shop located just 190 feet from 
the Daybreak Training School (R. 187-88, 195). There, he 
approached defendant, who was wearing a black leather coat and 
Defendant's biological father bore the surname "Martin," 
which was the name that appeared on defendant's driver's license 
and, consequently, on the arrest warrant. Nonetheless, defendant 
was generally known as Travis Ben Harding, reflecting the surname 
adopted by his mother when she married a man named Harding before 
defendant was born (R. 246). 
3 
talking to a mechanic about his car (R. 251-52). The detective 
served the warrant, took defendant into custody, and mirandized 
.-him (R. 188, 192). In response to the detective's question about 
whether defendant had any weapons or contraband on his person, 
defendant removed two knives from his pockets and turned them 
over to the detective. After a pat-down, the detective left the 
building with defendant (Id.). 
Prior to leaving for the police station, defendant told the 
detective that he needed to tell his grandfather, who had driven 
him to the auto shop, where they were going (R. 189). The 
detective testified: 
I asked [the grandfather] if he could tell me 
[defendant's] name. He indicated it was 
Travis. And I asked him if it was Travis 
Martin. He said it was. And at that time 
Travis, who is standing next to me, says -
kind of yells out, "Harding." And his 
grandfather looked at him and then he looked 
at me. And he said, "Well, he uses both 
names." 
(IdL) -
At the police station, the detective uncuffed defendant and 
asked him to remove his personal property from his pockets. 
Defendant retrieved some cigarettes. The detective testified: 
"But there was a bag. And it alerted me by the way he was 
removing these items . . . it was as if he were concealing 
something or attempting to . . . " (R. 190). The detective 
continued, "And the nature of how he was laying the cigarettes 
4 
down caused me to question what he was doing. So I moved the 
cigarettes. And I saw the bag, exposed the bag and I picked it 
up" (LcL) . 
The "bag" was the corner section of a plastic baggie, its 
lining coated with a white powder, with a more detectable amount 
at the bottom (R. 191, 205, 214). When the detective asked 
defendant what it was, defendant responded that he didn't know 
(R. 190). Then, with defendant watching, the detective performed 
a field test on the substance, which tested positively for 
methamphetamine (R. 191-92) . 
Defendant immediately became emotional (R. 192). Over 
objection by defense counsel, the detective testified that 
defendant said he "knew a lot of different illegal activity, 
stolen guns and drugs . . . that he could hook me up with so that 
I could give him a break on the criminal charges because he 
didn't want to go to jail" (R. 193). Defendant was "seemingly 
very desperate to work something out" (Id.) . 
At trial, defendant testified that the coat in which the 
drugs were found had been his, but that he had given it to his 
wife, who had been upset over losing a similar coat (R. 248). 
She had been wearing it regularly, while he had only picked it up 
that day because it happened to be hanging over a kitchen chair 
as he was on his way out the door to Rick's Auto (R. 249, 251). 
He further stated that the cigarettes found in the coat pocket 
5 
were his wife's brand, not his, and that he always carried his 
cigarettes in the back pocket of his pants rather than in his 
coat pocket (R. 255, 271). 
On cross-examination, defendant disputed significant aspec 
of the detective's testimony, which was based on a report the 
detective had written the day after the arrest (R. 212). 
Defendant testified that the detective neither told him that he 
possessed an arrest warrant nor asked him to turn over any 
weapons he might have (R. 261-62, 266). Defendant testified 
that, contrary to the detective's observation, he was not tryin 
to conceal anything when he emptied his pockets (R. 275). 
Defendant testified that the detective did not perform a drug 
field test in his presence (Id.). The detective, defendant 
asserted, suffered from a faulty memory. In contrast, although 
he made no notes of the events, defendant maintained that he 
possessed "quite an exceptional memory'' (R. 277). 
After considering the evidence presented and weighing the 
credibility of the witnesses, the jury convicted defendant as 
charged, of possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free 
zone, a second degree felony (R. 325, 326). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that evidence of the arrest warrant that 
prompted the detective to first confront him was inadmissible 
pursuant to rule 404 (b) . However, where the arrest warrant 
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served the non-character purpose of filling in facts necessary 
for the jury to understand how the detective came to discover 
defendant in possession of drugs, it was admissible. And, 
contrary to defendant's assertion, the warrant was also 
admissible pursuant to rule 403. Defendant failed to demonstrate 
how the probativeness of the evidence was substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Furthermore, because the 
warrant was substantively unrelated to the charge at issue here 
and addressed only a minor violation, it was unlikely to carry 
any prejudice at all, much less the degree of prejudice that 
would substantially outweigh its value in completing the story 
before the jury. 
Defendant also argues that his post-arrest statements, 
evidencing an attempt to "strike a deal" with the detective by 
providing information about criminal activity, were admitted in 
violation of the same two rules. At the outset, this argument 
fails because rule 404(b) refers to prior personal acts, and 
defendant's statements refer to the criminal activity of others. 
3ut, even if his statements are interpreted to mean that 
defendant himself was of bad character, the evidence would still 
come m under rule 404 (b) as probative evidence of knowledge and 
intent, the only disputed aspect of the charge before the jury. 
Finally, because the direct probativeness of the evidence was not 
sjostantially outweighed by any prejudice that might be 
7 
indirectly inferred from it, the evidence also passes muster 
under rule 403. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
EVIDENCE OF THE ARREST WARRANT WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED BECAUSE IT WAS 
RELEVANT FOR THE NON-CHARACTER 
PURPOSE OF EXPLAINING WHY THE 
OFFICER CONFRONTED DEFENDANT AT THE 
AUTO REPAIR SHOP AND BECAUSE NO 
SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE FLOWED FROM 
ITS ADMISSION 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion in limine to exclude evidence of the arrest warrant that 
prompted the detective to confront him at Rick's Auto (Br. of 
App. at 9). He asserts that the warrant evidence was 
inadmissible under rule 404(b) because it "was not proof of 
'motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge [or] 
identity.'" (Br. of App. at 11 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 404(b))). 
Defendant further asserts that the evidence was prejudicial 
because it undermined his credibility in the eyes of the jury 
(I^J • 
At the outset, rule 404(b), governing evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person, is an 
"inclusionary" rule. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993); State v. Taylor, 
818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991). That is, "[r]ule 404(b) does 
not exclude evidence unless it fits an exception; rather, it 
8 
allows admission of relevant evidence *other than to show merely 
the general disposition of the defendant.'" State v. Jamison, 767 
P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989)(quoting State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 
539, 546 (Utah 1983)). 
Here, reference to the outstanding arrest warrant served a 
clear "non-character purpose" because it completed the story of 
the case for the jury. See Utah R. Evid. 404 (b) (1998) .2 The 
story began when a police detective, pursuing an outstanding 
arrest warrant, and defendant, checking on the status of his car, 
converged at Rick's Auto (R. 187, 251). After the detective 
served the warrant and made the arrest, he asked defendant to 
empty his personal property from his pockets. In the course of 
doing so, defendant removed a baggie from his coat pocket, and 
the detective determined that it contained contraband (R. 190). 
Absent evidence of the outstanding warrant, the jury would 
have no explanation for the detective's presence at Rick's Auto. 
Indeed, absent the warrant, the detective would have had no 
" A recent addition to rule 404 (b) clarifies its meaning in 
light of State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). Now the 
rule contains the following final sentence: 
In other words, evidence offered under this 
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a 
non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (b) (1998) . Because this sentence clarifies, 
rather than changes, the rule in effect at the time this case was 
adjudicated, the phrase "non-character purpose" is used here as a 
shorthand reference to the essential import of the rule. 
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reason to approach defendant, arrest him, handcuff him, or ask 
him to empty his pockets. In essence, the evidence of the 
outstanding warrant "completed the story" by providing a factual 
basis for the detective's subsequent interaction with defendant. 
Courts may allow evidence of an arrest warrant in a 
subsequent prosecution when facts surrounding the arrest are 
necessary for the jury to understand the situation. See, e.g., 
United States v. Garces, 133 F.3d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir. 
1998)(admitting evidence of homicide arrest warrant as 
"explanatory background" for weapons charges arising from 
arrest); United States v. Utter, 97 F.3d 509, 513 (11- Cir. 
1996)(federal rule 404(b) does not exclude an uncharged offense 
which (1) "arose out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions as the charged offense, (2) [is] necessary to 
complete the story of the crime, or (3) [is] inextricably 
intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense") ; 
United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 272 (10"-" Cir. 
1995)(evidence is admissible when it provides context for the 
crime, is necessary to a full presentation of the case, or is 
appropriate in order to complete the story of the crime by 
proving its immediate context or res gestae (quoting United 
States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4" Cir. 1980)); State v. 
Lockheart, 410 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Iowa App. 1997)(when acts are so 
connected in time and place that they form a continuous 
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transaction, rule 404(b) does not prevent the whole transaction 
from being shown "to complete the story of what happened"); State 
v. Fleinold, 838 P.2d 462, 467 (Mo. App. 1992)("Evidence of a 
separate crime that is a part of a sequence of events connected 
to the crime for which the defendant is being tried is admissible 
because it is part of the res gestae of the crime charged" and 
"to present a complete and coherent picture of events 
surrounding" the main charge). 
While the search warrant here represented evidence of "other 
crimes, wrongs or acts" committed by defendant, it was introduced 
only to fill in facts necessary for the jury to understand how 
the detective came to discover defendant in possession of 
contraband. Two Utah courts have touched upon other such 
evidence used to complete a story. State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 
1207 (Utah App. 1991), tacitly applied the majority rule 
articulated above. It held that although rule 404 contains no 
express exception for "background information" showing how the 
charges came forward, "the prosecutor is entitled to paint a 
factual picture of the context in which the events in question 
transpired." .Id. at 1210 n.4. Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court 
earlier held that evidence showing "the general circumstances 
surrounding" the crime should not be excluded as "prior crimes" 
evidence. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 
1986)(evidence that defendant purchased stolen property with 
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marijuana was admissible over rule 404(b) objection). Because 
evidence of the arrest warrant here was used for the non-
character purpose of completing the story, it was likewise 
properly admitted under rule 404 (b) . 
The evidence of the arrest warrant was also admissible 
pursuant to rule 403, just as the trial court determined after 
weighing its probativeness against its potential prejudice. 
Defendant argues only that "[t]he fact that he was wanted for 
other criminal acts prejudiced his credibility with the jury" 
(Br. of App. at 11). Even assuming arguendo that this bald 
averment is correct, however, it would be insufficient to 
establish a violation of rule 403 because evidence is not 
inadmissible merely because it is prejudicial. That is, "[i]f 
evidence is prejudicial but is at least equally probative[,] . . 
. it is properly admissible. Taylor, 818 P.2d at 571. Indeed, 
all relevant evidence is presumed admissible pursuant to rule 403 
unless it has "an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, 
inflame, or mislead" the jury. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1221-22 (Utah 1993) . Because defendant has failed to articulate 
now the probativeness of the search warrant evidence was 
substantially outweighed by some prejudicial effect, his argument 
fails. 
Furthermore, vxif the evidence has relevancy to explain the 
circumstances surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible for 
12 
that purpose; and the fact that it may tend to connect the 
defendant with another crime[, wrong, or act] will not render it 
incompetent." State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 
1978) (citations omitted); accord State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d 
1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1991). 
Plainly, the evidence of the arrest warrant was relevant to 
explain the circumstances under which this case arose. Indeed, 
no other explanation for the detective's conduct existed. And, 
according to defendant's own testimony, the warrant arose from a 
fraudulent car inspection, not only an entirely different matter 
than the drug possession charge at issue here, but also a 
significantly less serious violation as well. The existence of 
an outstanding warrant arising from a vehicle inspection matter 
would be unlikely to rouse any reasonable jury to the degree of 
"overmastering hostility" that would mandate its exclusion. 
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). 
Because any possible prejudice flowing from the jury's 
knowledge that defendant was the subject of an outstanding arrest 
warrant was substantially outweighed by the probative value of 
the evidence to complete the story, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting it. 
13 
POINT TWO 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S POST ARREST 
STATEMENTS ADDRESS THE CONDUCT OF 
OTHER PERSONS, THEY DO NOT FALL 
WITHIN THE AMBIT OF RULE 404(b); TO 
THE EXTENT THAT THE STATEMENTS MAY 
BE INTERPRETED AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER, THEY ARE 
NONETHELESS ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 
404(b) BECAUSE THEY ALSO 
DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE 
AND INTENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting his 
post-arrest statements to the detective as "probative as to his 
intent to commit the crime charged," pursuant to rule 404(b). (R. 
54 or addendum A). Without articulating any specifics, he also 
argues that any probative value of the statements was "clearly 
outweighed" by their prejudicial impact (Br. of App. at 14). 
The statements to which defendant objects were uttered after 
the detective, in defendant's presence, conducted a field test on 
the white substance in the baggie (R. 191-92). According to the 
detective's testimony, when the test came up positive for 
methamphetamine, defendant "became very emotional" (R. 192): 
He said that he knew a lot of different 
illegal activity, stolen guns and drugs, that 
he was very aware of or had knowledge of that 
he could hook me up with so that I could give 
him a break on the criminal charges, because 
he didn't want to go to jail. And he was 
seemingly very desperate to work something 
out. 
(R. 193). Defendant asserts that his statements run afoul of 
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rule 404(b), which provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith." In 
essence, defendant seems to be arguing that his statements should 
not have been admitted because their sole purpose was to 
demonstrate that he was a bad person with a criminal disposition 
who, by possessing drugs, acted in conformity with that 
disposition. 
Defendant's argument fails on several fronts. At the 
outset, rule 404(b) refers to "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" 
committed by defendant. See Daniels, 584 P.2d at 882 (under 
predecessor rule, "evidence of other crimes allegedly committed 
by the defendant is not admissible if the purpose is to disgrace 
the defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity to 
commit crime and thus likely to have committed the crime 
charged")(emphasis added). In contrast, defendant's statements 
to the detective plainly referenced criminal activity committed 
by others. In essence, defendant was offering his services as a 
confidential informant: in exchange for a "deal" on the drug 
charge inevitably emerging from the discovery of methamphetamine 
in his pocket, defendant would divulge information about crimes 
committed by others that would impliedly surpass what the 
detective had on him. Thus, defendant's statements, referring 
not to his own past criminal activity, but to the criminal 
15 
activity of others, did not fall within the ambit of rule 404 (b) . 
Defendant argues that his statements do implicate rule 
404(b) because they imply personal familiarity with individuals 
involved in criminal conduct (Br. of App. at 11). Thus, if a 
defendant associated with persons of bad character, a jury might 
infer that he, too, was a person of bad character and, in this 
instance, was merely acting in conformity with that character.3 
Even given this reading, however, defendant's claim must 
fail because an additional, non-character purpose existed for the 
admission of his statements. The law is well-settled that 
"[a]dmission of prior bad acts is proper when it tends to prove a 
contested material element of the crime charged." State v. 
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App. 1990). In this case, where 
it is undisputed that defendant was found in possession of 
methamphetamine, the only contested element of the charge was his 
knowledge and intent. Indeed, the defense rested entirely on 
defendant's assertion that he had no idea there was 
methamphetamine in his coat pocket (R. 257, 311, 316). Because 
defendant's eagerness to make a deal with the detective undercut 
his claim of ignorance by showing consciousness of guilt, its 
This argument seems to resonate more with rule 404(a) 
than with rule 404 (b) . However, because defendant did not make 
such a claim either in the trial court or in this Court, the 
claim is waived. State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 214 (Utah 
1933); State v. Steaqell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). 
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admission was proper as evidence of his knowledge and intent.4 
State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Utah App. 1996). 
Defendant's statements, as the trial court determined after 
engaging in the proper weighing process, were also admissible 
pursuant to rule 403. The threshold inquiry is "whether the 
proferred evidence has an unusual propensity to unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1221. Since defendant does not assert that his statements had 
unusual prejudicial effect, he "must overcome rule 403's 
presumption in favor of admitting the proferred evidence." Id. 
at 1222. 
Here, the issue of defendant's intent to possess the drugs 
was central to the disposition of the case. His statements, 
carrying a strong inference of consciousness of guilt, were 
directly probative of his knowledge and intent. In contrast, his 
statements only weakly inferred that he committed this particular 
crime because he was a person of bad character who was acting in 
conformity with that character. That is, several inferential 
steps are required to get from defendant's statement that he was 
aware of criminal activity to the ultimate conclusion that 
4
 Defendant argues that defendant had no knowledge of the 
drugs and that his statements reflect a panicked response to the 
discovery of the contraband in his pocket rather than an insight 
into his knowledge and intent (Br. of App. at 11). Because the 
evidence is susceptible to multiple interpretations, however, its 
significance was properly left to the jury. See State v. Myers, 
606 P.2d 250, 252-53 (Utah 1980). 
17 
defendant committed this particular crime with knowledge and 
intent. Because the direct probativeness of the statements are 
not substantially outweighed by the attenuated prejudice that 
could flow from them, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
second degree felony conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance in a drug-free zone. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
Because the proper interpretation of rule 404 (b) could be 
further clarified based on this case, the State requests both 
oral argument and a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \^_ day of September, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
L 
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CASE NO. 961401599 
DATE: April 9, 1997 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion in Limine. Having 
received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of the Motion, the 
Court hereby grants in part and denies in part the Motion and delivers the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
The defendant, Travis Ben Harding, is charged with Possession of 
Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony and is set for trial before 
this Court on April 10, 1997. The Defendant has an extensive criminal history, including 
prior convictions for Possession of a Controlled Substance, Attempted Aggravated Assault, 
Assault on a Peace Officer, and Criminal Trespass. The Defendant has served time on these 
convictions in the Utah County Jail, as well as a federal prison in Arizona. 
When the Defendant was taken into custody on October 24, 1996, he made 
statements to the arresting officer about his inyolvement and contacts with drug suppliers and 
a theft ring. The Defendant now requests this Court prohibit the use of these prior 
convictions and statements in the jury trial set for April 10. 
0055 
Opinion of the Court 
The Court agrees with the Defendants assertion of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and will not allow any evidence of prior criminal behavior or convictions as 
character evidence to prove conformity therewith in the State's case in chief. The Court will 
also not allow any references to prior crimes for general impeachment purposes. However, 
the Court will allow the State to address the Defendant's prior criminal history to impeach 
specific statements of the Defendant should he choose to testify in his own behalf. In 
particular, should the Defendant testify that he has no knowledge of or involvement in drugs, 
the Court will allow evidence of his prior conviction to be introduced and the Defendant may 
be questioned about prior drug convictions on cross-examination. 
The Court denies the Defendant's motion as to the statements made to the arresting 
officer on October 24, 1996. An essential element of the offense of possession of 
methamphetamines is intent. The Court finds that the Defendant's statements are probative 
as to his intent to commit the crime charged. In addition, the Court finds that the probative 
value of the statements outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence regarding 
outstanding warrants that resulted in the Defendant being in custody will be admitted relative 
to the statements made to the arresting officer. 
Order 
The Court hereby grants the Defendant's Motion in Limine with respect to evidence 
of prior crimes offered for general impeachment purposes. The Court denies the Defendant's 
Motion with respect to evidence of prior crimes offered for specific impeachment purposes, 
and with respect to statements by the Defendant to the arresting officer. 
DATED this 9th day of April, 1997. 
